Integrity constraints represent knowledge about data with which a database must be consistent. 
Introduction
A database state is said to be consistent if the database satisfies a set of statements, called semantic integrity constraints (or simply constraints). Integrity constraints specify those configurations of the data that are considered semantically correct. Any update operation (insert, delete or modify) or transaction (sequence of updates) that occurs must not result in a state that violates these constraints. Thus, a fundamental issue concerning integrity constraints is constraint checking, that is the process of ensuring that the integrity constraints are satisfied by the database after it has been updated. Checking the consistency of a database state will generally involve the execution of integrity tests on the database which verify whether the database is satisfying its constraints or not.
The growing complexity of modern database applications plus the need to support multiple users has further increased the need for a powerful integrity subsystem to be incorporated into these systems. Therefore, a complete integrity subsystem is considered to be an important part of any modern DBMS. The crucial problem in designing a complete integrity subsystem is the difficulty of devising an efficient algorithm for enforcing database integrity against updates. Thus, it is not surprising that much attention has been paid to the maintenance of integrity in centralized databases over the last decade. A naive approach is to perform the update and then check whether the integrity constraints are satisfied in the new database state. This method, termed brute force checking, is very expensive, impractical and can lead to prohibitive processing costs. Enforcement is costly because the evaluation of integrity constraints requires assessing large amounts of data which are not involved in the database update transition. Hence, improvements to this approach have been reported in many research papers. Although this research effort has yielded fruitful results that have given centralized systems a substantial level of reliability and robustness with respect to the integrity of their data, there has so far been little research carried out on integrity issues for distributed databases. The problem of devising an efficient enforcement mechanism is more crucial in a distributed environment.
The brute force strategy of checking constraints is worse in the distributed context since the checking would typically require data transfer as well as computation leading to complex algorithms to determine the most efficient approach. Allowing an update to execute with the intention of aborting it at commit time in the event of constraint violation is also inefficient since rollback and recovery must occur at all sites which participated in the update. Moreover, devising an efficient algorithm for enforcing database integrity against updates is extremely difficult to implement and can lead to prohibitive processing costs in a distributed environment.
In this paper, we propose a strategy for constraint checking in a distributed database environment where data distribution is transparent to the application domain. By database distribution we mean that a collection of data which belongs logically to the same system is physically spread over the sites (nodes) of the computer network where intersite data communication is a critical factor affecting the system's performance. The technique that we propose allows the initial integrity constraints to be validated by localizing constraint checking to where data at the target site (at which the modification is made) is accessed, hence eliminating the cost of accessing remote data.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, the basic definitions and notations which are used in the rest of this paper are given. Section 3 discusses the integrity enforcement techniques while Section 4 introduces our method for deriving integrity tests. Conclusions can be found in the final section.
Preliminaries
Our approach has been developed in the context of relational databases, which can be regarded as consisting of two distinct parts, namely: an intensional part and an extensional part. A relational distributed database schema is described as a quadruple (D, IC, FR, AS) where IC is a finite set of integrity constraints, FR is a finite set of fragmentation rules and AS is a finite set of allocation schemas.
Database integrity constraints are expressed in prenex conjunctive normal form with the range restricted property [2] . A set of fragmentation rules, FR, specifies the set of restrictions, C i , that must be satisfied by each fragment R i . These rules introduce a new set of integrity constraints and therefore have the same notation as IC. For simplicity, we will consider horizontal fragmentation only. We assume that the fragmentation of relations satisfies the completeness, the disjointness and the reconstructability properties. An allocation schema locates a fragment, R i , to one or more sites.
For the rest of this paper, we will consider the following supply-sale-class relational database which is taken from [2] . Assume that the Supply and Sale relations are horizontally fragmented into 2 fragments {Supply_1, Supply_2} and {Sale_1, Sale_2} respectively, based on the conditions: dept = D1 and dept = D2; and that the Class relation is horizontally fragmented into 2 fragments, {Class_1, Class_2}, based on the conditions: type = T1 and type = T2. The fragmentation rules FR i produced by the above conditions are as follows: FR 1 : ( x y z)(Supply_1(x, y, z) (y = D1)) FR 2 : ( x y z)(Supply_2(x, y, z) (y = D2)) FR 3 : ( x y z)(Sale_1(x, y, z) (x = D1)) FR 4 : ( x y z)(Sale_2(x, y, z) (x = D2)) FR 5 : ( x y z)(Class_1(x, y, z) (y = T1)) FR 6 : ( x y z)(Class_2(x, y, z) (y = T2)) Table 1 below lists the integrity constraints that are used in this paper. (a)'s are the global constraints in prenex form while (b)'s are the equivalent fragment constraints. The algorithm for transforming a global constraint into a set of equivalent fragment constraints is omitted here since this can be found in [1] . Table 1 : Integrity Constraints Domain Constraints: IC-1: 'When a sale occurs the quantity must be > 0' (a) ( x y z)(Sale(x, y, z) z > 0) (b) ( x y z)(Sale_i(x, y, z) z > 0) for i {1, 2} Key Constraints: IC-2: 'Every class has a unique item number' (a) ( v w x y z)(Class(v, w, x) Class(v, y, z) (w = y) (x = z)) (b) ( v w x y z)(Class_i(v, w, x) Class_j(v, y, z) (w = y) (x = z)) for i {1, 2} and j {1, 2} Referential Integrity Constraints: IC-3: 'When a department sells an item then there is a company which supplies it with this item' (a) ( w x y z)(Sale(w, x, y) Supply(z, w, x)) (b) ( w x y z)(Sale_i(w, x, y) Supply_i(z, w, x)) for i {1, 2} Semantic Integrity Constraints: IC-4: 'No other companies than company 'C1' supply type 'T2' items' (a) ( w x y z)(Supply(w, x, y) Class(y, 'T2', z) (w = 'C1')) (b) ( w x y z)(Supply_i(w, x, y) Class_2(y, 'T2', z) (w = 'C1')) for i {1, 2} IC-5: 'Any company that supplies guns also supplies bullets' (a) ( x y z)(Supply(x, y, 'guns') Supply(x, z, 'bullets')) (b) ( x y z)(Supply_i(x, y, 'guns') Supply_j(x, z, 'bullets')) for i {1, 2} and j {1, 2} Transition Constraint: IC-6: 'When a class is updated, the new price must be greater than the old price' (a) ( w x y z)(Class old (w, x, y) Class new (w, x, z) (z > y)) (b) ( w x y z)(Class old _i(w, x, y) Class new _i(w, x, z) (z > y)) for i {1, 2}
Integrity Enforcement Techniques
A database state D is said to be consistent if and only if it satisfies the set of integrity constraints, IC, denoted by D |= IC. A database state D may change into a new state D u when it is updated either by a single update operation or by a sequence of updates (transaction), u. If a constraint is false in the new state, i.e. D u is inconsistent, the enforcement mechanism can either perform compensatory actions to produce a new consistent state D' u , or restore D by undoing u.
The process described above is known as integrity constraint enforcement and consists of the following steps: (i) generate the integrity tests, which are queries composed from the integrity constraints and the update operations; (ii) run these queries against the database; and (iii) depending on the result of the queries, trigger the appropriate actions to make the database consistent. Steps (i) and (ii) here, which check whether all the integrity constraints of the database are satisfied, are referred to as integrity checking and can be considered under two broad headings, namely: detection methods and prevention methods.
For a distributed database, integrity constraint checking methods can be classified under two further headings, namely: global methods and local methods. Global methods, which are based upon the concept of global tests, perform constraint checking by accessing data at remote sites, whilst local methods, which are based upon the concept of local tests, perform constraint checking by accessing data at the local site.
The integrity tests that are evaluated to verify the consistency of a database within the local legal region are referred to as local tests. Since these tests can only identify a subset of legal states (i.e. tests which are sufficient), alternative tests are required, namely those that are evaluated outside the boundary of this local legal region. These tests are referred to as global tests. Thus, in a distributed database, four types of integrity tests can be identified. There are global post-tests, local post-tests, global pre-tests and local pre-tests. These tests should possess at least one of the properties mentioned in [2] , namely: sufficient, necessary and complete.
For a distributed database, techniques that construct tests that avoid remote reads and transfer of information across the network also seem attractive. Local pre-tests seem more effective to us than other types of test since: (i) only a single site is involved in evaluating the local pretests; (ii) as they are evaluated at a target site, this avoids remote reading and the amount of data transferred across the network during integrity enforcement is minimizedin fact, no data transfer across the network is required; and (iii) they are evaluated before the update is performed, which avoids the need to undo an update in the event of constraint violation, and thus reduces the overhead cost of checking integrity.
Integrity Test Generation Techniques
This section presents the algorithms that are used to construct local pre-tests. Before the algorithms are defined, some notations and theorems need to be understood.
The update operation and the theorem
We assume completeness and reconstructability of fragmentation. At run-time, when a user requests an update, the actual update is mapped into equivalent "fragment updates" by using the knowledge about data distribution, so that fragments which are not affected by the update will not be considered at all.
Given a constraint specified in prenex conjunctive normal form, the update theorems specify the update operations that will never violate the constraint. The proofs of these theorems can be found in [3, 2] and are therefore omitted here. These theorems are as follows:
Theorem 1: Whenever an update operation is dealing with the extension of a relation R, integrity constraints in which R does not occur are unaffected. In other words, an update operation on a relation R will not violate constraints in which R has no occurrences. Theorem 2: Integrity constraints which do not contain R in a negated atomic formula are unaffected when a tuple is inserted into the extension of R. In other words, an insert operation on a relation R will not violate constraints in which R has no negative occurrences. Theorem 3: Integrity constraints which do not contain R in a nonnegated atomic formula are unaffected when a tuple is deleted from the extension of R. In other words, a delete operation on a relation R will not violate constraints in which R has no positive occurrences.
The algorithms for generating integrity tests
Before the steps for generating the integrity tests are illustrated, we would like to highlight the following notations and their intended meaning which are important to the subsequent discussion.
IC. An integrity constraint which is either a global or a fragment constraint. The integrity tests generated by our work are either global-tests or local-tests depending on the type of the integrity constraint being considered. Two different algorithms are employed for deriving these tests, namely: Algorithm-A which is proposed by [2] and Algorithm-B which is a modification of the latter approach.
TR.
A local-test, LT, is derived by applying the substitution and absorption rules to an integrity constraint, IC-i, with respect to its associated update, Ui. The test derived by algorithm-B makes reference only to the target relation TR. We assume that all tuples in TR before the update satisfy the IC-i.
Let {A TR1 , A TR2 , …, A TRm } be the set attributes in TR, {A OR1 , A OR2 , …, A ORn } be the set of attributes in OR. Let Ci be the conditions (restrictions) imposed in IC-i on attribute A TRi , where A TRi is not a key of TR and Ci can be C1 C2 … Cl. Let Ri be the range allowed by Ci on attribute A TRi . Let <f1, f2, …, fn> be a tuple in TR and <e1, e2, …, en> be the inserted tuple. Based on the assumption made earlier, <f1, f2, …, fn> satisfies Ci, i.e. the actual value of fi is in the allowed range Ri. If the value of ei is in the range of the value of fi then by the transitive rule, the value of ei is also in the allowed range, Ri, and therefore the inserted tuple <e1, e2, …, en> satisfies Ci, which also implies that inserting the tuple <e1, e2, …, en> will not violate the IC-i. Table 2 shows the steps required to generate a local test(s) for an insert operation and Table 3 shows the steps required to generate a local test(s) for a delete operation. A modify operation is modeled by a delete operation followed by an insert operation. -is a set of attributes that belongs to both TR and OR.
Step 3 Let -be the set of substitutions obtained by applying to ETR in IC.
Step 4 Let -be the set of substitutions obtained by applying to ETO in IC.
Step 5 Apply -and -to IC. Replace each pre-valued literal by its truth value and apply as much as possible, the absorption rules. All OR and EOR are eliminated by assuming that they are false or true (if they are in form) in the IC. Let W be the obtained formula. Repeat
Step 5 by applying -to IC.
We now present some detailed examples for Algorithm-B which will clarify the steps presented above. Test-IC-iA (Test-IC-iB, respectively) denotes that the test is derived using Algorithm-A (Algorithm-B respectively). Class_i(a, w, x) ) Test-IC-2B 2 (Sufficient): ( w x)( Class_i(a, w, x)) IC-3: Update: INSERT (Sale_i(a, b, c) ( Sale_i(a, b, y) Supply_i(z, a, b) ) ( y) ( Sale_i(a, b, y) false) W = ( y) ( Sale_i(a, b, y)) Step 6: Negate W = ( y) (Sale_i(a, b, y) ) Test-IC-3B + (Sufficient): ( y)(Sale_i(a, b, y)) Update: DELETE (Supply_i(a, b, c) Class_2(c, 'T2', z) (a = 'C1')) ( x)( Supply_i(a, x, c) false false) W = ( x)( Supply_i(a, x, c))
Step 6: Negate W, ( x) (Supply_i(a, x, c) ) Test-IC-4B 1 (Sufficient): ( x)(Supply_i(a, x, c))
Step 5: Apply + to IC-4, ( w x z)( Supply_i(w, x, c) Class_2(c, 'T2', z) (w = 'C1')) ( w x)( Supply_i(w, x, c) false (w = 'C1')) W = ( w x)( Supply_i(w, x, c) (w = 'C1'))
Step 6: Negate W, ( w x)(Supply_i(w, x, c) (w 'C1')) Test-IC-4B 2 (Sufficient): ( w x)(Supply_i(w, x, c) (w 'C1')) Update: INSERT (Class_2(a, 'T2', b) 
Step 1: (Class_2) = {y/a, z/b}, (Supply_i) = {y/a}
Step 2: + = = {y/a}
Step 3: + = {} Step 4: + = {}, + = {y/a} Step 5: Apply + , + and + to IC-4, ( w x z)( Supply_i(w, x, a) Class_2(a, 'T2', z) (w = 'C1')) ( z)(false Class_2(a, 'T2', z) false) W = ( z)( Class_2(a, 'T2', z))
Step 6: Negate W, ( z) (Class_2(a, 'T2', z) ) Test-IC-4B 3 (Sufficient): ( z) (Class_2(a, 'T2', z) ( y z)( Supply_i(a, y, 'guns') Supply_j(a, z, 'bullets')) ( y)( Supply_i(a, y, 'guns') false) W = ( y)( Supply_i(a, y, 'guns')) Step 6: Negate W, ( y)(Supply_i(a, y, 'guns')) Test-IC-5B + (Sufficient): ( y)(Supply_i(a, y, 'guns')) Update: DELETE(Supply_j(a, b, 'bullets')) Test-IC-5A
-(Complete): 2 i=1 ( x y)( Supply_i(x, y, 'guns')) Step 1: (Supply_j) = {x/a, z/b}, (Supply_i) = {x/a}
Step 2: -= = {x/a}
Step 3: -= {} Step 4: -= {} Step 5: Apply -and -to IC-5, ( y z)( Supply_i(a, y, 'guns') Supply_j(a, z, 'bullets')) ( z)(false Supply_j(a, z, 'bullets')) W = ( z) ( Supply_j(a, z, 'bullets') ) Test-IC-5B
- ( Since the cost of evaluating integrity constraints in a distributed environment is related to both the number of constraints to be evaluated and the number of sites involved, the next step is to allocate each integrity test to a site or minimal number of sites so that the irrelevant sites are excluded from the computation of certain sets of integrity tests. This objective is achieved by allocating each test to a site(s) if and only if there is a fragment relation at that site which is specified in the test. Table 4 shows the allocation of each integrity tests derived above. Here Case I in the table is a reasonable case where each sale_i, supply_i and class_i for i {1, 2} are allocated to the same site, and Case II is a worst case where each fragment is allocated to a different site of the network. As shown in the table, most of the integrity tests can be evaluated at the site where the update is to be performed. This reduces the number of sites involved and the amount of data transferred across the network during the evaluation of these tests. Also, the amount of data needing to be accessed is minimized as only fragments of relations are accessed. (ii) Validation that may have to retrieve further information from the database to validate a constraint. The validation of single-relation multivariable constraints (such as functional dependencies) and multirelation multivariable constraints (such as referential/foreign key constraints) are in this category. In distributed databases, a fragment constraint can either be a local fragment constraint (each fragment mentioned in the constraint has a copy physically stored at the local site) or a non-local fragment constraint. Retrieving information which is local to a site can be viewed in the same way as retrieving information in a centralized system. Therefore the integrity tests generated are always local to the site. For the case of non-local fragment constraints, the enforcement cost can be reduced if the information required can be derived from the site where the target fragment is located. For example, consider the test Test-IC-4A 1 (Complete): ( y z)( Class_2(y, 'T2', z) (a = 'C1')). This test shows that it is necessary to check Class_2 fragment (if a 'C1') to verify that the update (insert operation in this case) will not violate IC-4. The evaluation of the test involves accessing data at a remote site (with the assumption that each fragment is located at a different sites). A useful optimisation in this situation is to be able to generate a local test over the target fragment such that if there exists at least one tuple in the target fragment which satisfies the local test, and with the assumption that the database is consistent prior to update, then the database is guaranteed to be consistent after the update, i.e. the update will not violate the initial integrity constraint. A local test for IC-4 is as follows, Test-IC-4B 2 (Sufficient): ( w x)(Supply_i(w, x, c) (w 'C1')). This test states that the initial constraint is satisfied if there is an existing tuple in Supply_i fragment which is not for company 'C1' and the supply item is 'c'. The derived local test makes references only to the target fragment and thus communication cost can be reduced. (iii) Validation that has to retrieve some data and update objects in order to obtain another valid database extension. This is known as update propagation. Consider IC-3. An attempt to DELETE Supply_i will generate a test which will check that department 'b' will no longer be selling item 'c', i.e. ( y) ( Sale_i(b, c, y) ). Again, assume that each fragment is located at a different site, therefore there are at least two sites involved. This process can be reduced to one site (target site) by generating the following local test, ( z) (Supply_i(z, b, c) ) which states that the above operation is valid if there exists at least one supplier other than 'a' who supplies item 'c' to department 'b'.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a technique for integrity constraint checking in a distributed database. The technique proposed by [2] is extended so that global constraints can be validated by localising constraint checking. We have also extended our technique in [1] so that the integrity tests derived is not limited to static integrity constraints but can be extended to transition constraints.
Our method generates integrity tests at compile-time. When an update request is to be executed, local tests are selected in order to minimise the amount of data accessed or transferred across the network during integrity enforcement activity. These tests, which are evaluated before the update is performed, avoid the need to undo (rollback and recover from) an update in the event of constraint violation, and thus reduce the overhead cost of checking integrity. If a local test is not applicable then a global test is selected.
